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HON. ICHAEL A. MUSMANNO*
On May 25, 1955, the Chief Justice and five Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania ordered that a Dissenting Opinion written by Justice
Michael A. Musmanno of that Court not be published in the Pennsylvania State
Reports. That order entered by the majority of the Court was a jurisdictional in-
trusion and plainly coram non judice. The Supreme Court possesses no power
to determine which of its Opinions shall and which shall not see the light of
day in the official publications of the Commonwealth.
The Opinions of the Supreme and Superior Courts are printed in the
official Reports by authority of the Act of 1943,1 which specifically declares:
"The decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and of the Superior Court
shall be published under the supervision of the State Reporter."
What is meant by "decisions"? The narrowest and strictest definition of
the word would be the fragmentary phrase at the end of the Opinion which
says: "Judgment Affirmed" or "Judgment Reversed." Obviously the Act of
1943 does not intend any such compressed construction. A decision is the author-
itative expression of the Court, embracing in its obvious scope the official declar-
ations of all the Justices. Since 1943 there has not been one instance, except
where Justice Musmanno's Opinions were involved, where the present State
Reporter did not publish all Dissenting Opinions written and filed by the Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court. It is noteworthy that the Act of 1943, in its man-
date that decisions "shall" be published, makes no distinction between major-
ity and minority Opinions.
The Federal statute which authorizes the printing of the United States
Supreme Court Opinions employs almost precisely the same phraseology which
appears in the Pennsylvania statute, namely, "The decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States shall be printed ...... As in the Pennsylvania statute, no
referencd is made to the printing of Opinions contrary to the vote of the major-
ity of the Court; but even to suggest that the Minority Opinions of the United
States Supreme Court might not be published would be as fanciful as asserting
that opposition debates against legislative proposals of the Executive Department
should be banned from the Congressional Record.
The Dissenting Opinions of the United States Supreme Court have al-
ways been regarded as part of its official decisions. The very first Opinion prom-
* Associate Justice, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania; B. A. and M. A. George Washington Uni.
versity; LL. B. Georgetown University; Master of Laws and Master of Patent Laws, National
University; D. J. S. American University; J. D. University of Rome.
1 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 1731.1 - .10 (Purdon 1955).
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ulgated in that tribunal was a Dissenting Opinion by Mr. Justice Thomas John-
son in Georgia v. Bailsford,2 as a result of the early practice of seriatim Opin-
ions beginning with the latest appointee. The Dissenting Opinion in the case
of Chisholm v. Georgia,3 became the basis of the Eleventh Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States. The Dissenting Opinions in the Dred Scott
case supplied the foundations for the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. United States Supreme Court
Justice Robert H. Jackson said in 1951:
"A court opinion which puts out a misleading impression of un-
animity by aviding, or confusing, an underlying difference is a false
beacon to the profession. Far better that the division be forthrightly
exposed so that the profession will know on what narrow grounds the
case rests and can form some estimate of how changed facts may affect
the alignment in a subsequent case." 4
Justice Alex Simpson, Jr., of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, writing in
1923, said:
"Justice to the litigants would seem to require a dissenting judge
to set forth at length his opinion in regard to proper subjects for dis-
sent in an appellate court-not merely because the latter is entitled to
know his individual judgment in regard to them, but also in order that
the losing party below may not be unnecessarily handicapped on the
appeal." 5
For one hundred years the Dissenting Opinions of the Justices of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania have been published in the State Reports. Why was an
exception made in the Tribune Review Publishing Co. case?6 Some legal his-
tory is here in order.
On March 1, 1954, John Wesley Wable, referred to in the press as the
"phantom killer," went on trial for his life in the courthouse at Greensburg,
Pennsylvania, accused of having feloniously slain two motorists on the Penn-
sylvania Turnpike. The events of the killings, which had naturally received
enormous attention in the newspapers, inevitably stirred great public interest
in the trial with its inevitable drama, suspense, and awesome issue hanging
in the balance. To supply its readers with pictorial as well as written coverage
of the courtroom proceedings, the editor of the Greensburg Morning Review
and Daily Tribune assigned a news photographer to obtain pictures of the
defendant and others who had fatefully been drawn into the murder story.
However, when the photographer and the editor himself arrived at the court-
house, they were warned by the Sheriff of Westmoreland County, Howard Budd
Thomas, that any attempt on their part to use a camera would subject them to
contempt-of-court-punishment since the judges of Westmoreland County had
2 1 U. S. (2 DalI.) 13 (1793).
3 1 U. S. (2 DalI.) 13 (1793).
4 100 PT. L. J. 3 (1952).
5 71 U. PA. L. REV. 3-13 (1923).
0 379 Pa. 92 (1955).
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the week before announced a Rule of Court prohibiting photography in the
courthouse and county jail.
On March 2, 1954, the Tribune Review Publishing Company, availing
itself of the Act of Congress of June 25, 1948, 7 sought in the United States
District Court a restraining order to prevent the Sheriff of Westmoreland Coun-
ty from enforcing the Rule of Court mentioned. The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette,
which had also sent in vain a photographer to Greensburg, joined in this action.
After a hearing lasting several days, the District Court, speaking through Chief
Judge Wallace Gourley, entered an order directing that proceedings be stayed-
"pending a determination of proceedings to be brought with reasonable
promptness in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to have adjudicated
the legality of the order or regulation issued by the Courts of Westmore-
land County."
With reasonable promptness the Tribune Review Publishing Company and
the Pennsylvania Newspapers Publishers Association applied to the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania for a writ of prohibition against the judges of the Court
of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County to prevent the enforcement of
the Rule of Court in question. The defendants in the action maintained (1) that
there was no justiciable question involved since no one had actually been arrested,
and (2) that the plaintiffs had no rights which had been infringed. On April
12, 1954, the Supreme Court ordered the case on the argument list for hearing
at Harrisburg, specifying that the matters to be argued were: "(1) Whether
the question is presently moot and academic; (2) the merits of the controversy."
On May 25, 1954, counsel for both sides argued at length before the full
Court. Some four hours were consumed in the presentation of the case, during
which time the Chief Justice vigorously asserted from the bench that every per-
son had a right not to be photographed against his wish. One or two other
Justices supported this view, still others supported different views. The writer
voiced the opinion that once a person participated in a public event he was more
or less in the public domain and he could no more object to being photographed
than he could to being written about. During the argument, time was also de-
voted to discussing the question as to whether the petitioners were entitled to
an adjudication in this litigation since no one had actually been arrested or
punished as the result of any alleged violation of the prohibitory Rule of Court.
One or more of the Justices suggested from the bench that a justiciable
question would arise if a press photographer violated the Rule of Court, was
prosecuted and subjected to a penalty, and then appealed to the Supreme Court.
The writer stated he did not approve of such a procedure because it implied
that the law itself invited deliberate violations. Furthermore, the writer de-
clared that no citizen should be required to subject himself to the ignominy of
a jail sentence in order to ascertain his constitutional rights. Once the Court
7 62 STAT. 932 (1948), 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (1950).
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forbade the petitioners from asserting a right to which they were constitution-
ally entitled, a cause of action arose, the writer insisted.
It was then suggested by counsel and by one or more members of the Court
that an amicable test case could be prepared with an expeditious appeal to
the Supreme Court, at which time the question of constitutionality and legality
of the Court Rule would be resolved. At the consultation of the Justices of the
Supreme Court which followed the oral argument, the writer repeated and reaf-
firmed the views he had expressed from the bench. After some discussion
the Chief Justice declared he would endeavor to have the parties agree to an
amicable test case.
On June 28, 1954, the Justices met for consultation in Philadelphia, and
the Tribune Review Publishing case, (hereinafter to be referred to as the Tribune
case), was discussed. Two or three days previously the Chief Justice had cir-
culated among the other Justices for their consideration a "Per Curiam '' 8 Opin-
ion which called for a dismissal of the Writ of Prohibition. The consultation
date fell so soon after the circulation of the Majority Opinion that no oppor-
tunity was allowed for the formulation of a Dissenting Opinion prior to the
meeting. Accordingly, the writer recommended that the filing of the Major-
ity Opinion be delayed so that he might prepare a dissent in accordance with
the views he had orally declared from the bench and which he had reaffirmed
at the first judicial consultation on the subject.9 The Chief Justice asked Jus-
tice Musmanno to withhold any Dissenting Opinion because an amicable test
case would undoubtedly be initiated in Westmoreland County and thus, on the
re-argument before the Supreme Court, he could present his position. The
Chief Justice said he would talk to one of the prominent counsel on the petition-
ers' side, and, once obtaining the assurance that a new case would be launched,
he would notify the writer, whereupon the latter's Dissent would not need to
be written or filed. A day or two later, the Chief Justice called the writer by
telephone (as he had now returned to Pittsburgh after the session in Philadel-
phia) and stated that he, the Chief Justice, had talked to counsel and he was
certain an amicable action would be initiated.
The Majority Opinion was filed on June 29, 1954, but in spite of the as-
surances of an amicable test case, nothing happened. It was further learned
from the Associated Press that there was no indication that there would be any
so-called amicable test case. Accordingly the writer prepared a Dissenting Opin-
ion, and on July 8, 1954, nine days after the Majority Opinion had been hand-
ed down, he filed it with the Prothonotary of the Supreme Court, Western Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania, who entered the Opinionon the docket, made all other
8 It is a mistaken impression that "Per Curiam" means a unanimous decision. It means no
more than it says: "By the Court". A "Per Curiam" decision may be rendered on a 4 to 3 vote
and even by a divided court. Bryn Mawr v. Baldt, 268 Pa. 259, 100 At. 743 (1917).
9 The writer here is not divulging any intramural conversations which were not made part
of the record in the case of Musmanno v. Eldredge, 1 Pa. D. & C. 2d 535 (1955) ; 382 Pa. 167,
114 A. 2d 511 (1955).
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suitable entries on the papers in the case, and sent out 26 copies of the Opinion
to the various Courts, publishing houses, and persons entitled to copies of
all Supreme Court Opinions. Copies were, of course, immediately mailed to all
the Justices.
For four months nothing was done about printing either the Majority Opin-
ion or the Dissenting Opinion in the Pennsylvania State Reports. Then, on No-
vember 9, 1954, at a routine consultation of the Justices in Philadelphia, the
Chief Justice advanced the startling proposition that the Dissenting Opinion
should not be published because it was filed "too late." This statement over-
looked the fact that the nine days' retardation was due to the Chief Justice's
own entreaty that the Dissenting Opinion be withheld-at least temporarily.
Furthermore, the post-filing of a Dissenting Opinion is not unprecedented or
unique. It has happened on numerous occasions in both the Supreme and Super-
ior Court. Of course, while not a practice to be encouraged, it is apparent that
situations do arise, as in this one precisely, where it is impossible for the Dis-
sent to be prepared before the time the Majority insists on filing the Opinion
of the Court. As recently as June 27, 1955, Justice Chidsey handed down his
Opinion in the case of Yiddisher Kultur Farband,10 a copy of which we had
received only 2 or 3 days previously. The writer asked that the filing of the
Majority Opinion be delayed to give him a chance to prepare a dissent. Justice
Chidsey and the others insisted on filing the Majority Opinion forthwith, and
this was done, with the understanding that the Dissenting Opinion could be
filed later. It was filed in August.
Following are a few of the cases which can be found in the State Reports
where the Dissenting Opinions post-dated the Majority Opinion: Com. v. Bar-
nak;11 Johnson v. Rulon;'2 Phila. Electric v. Phila.;13 Beirne v. Continental Equi-
table Title & Trust Co.;14 Holly v. Ashe;15 Com. v. Kilgallen.16 In some of
these cases the Dissenting Opinion followed the Majority Opinion by as long
a time as from one to three months.
Thus, it was distressingly unprecedented for Laurence Eldredge to state,
as he did on November 11, 1954, that he did not intend to print in the State
Reports the Dissenting Opinion in the important Tribune case. The failure
to print this Dissent would place not only the writer, but the Court itself, in
an anomalous position, because while the State Reports would be announcing a
unanimity in the Tribune case decision, the official docket would show the
contrary. To that extent, the State Reports would be proclaiming a falsehood.
For the integrity of the record and the dignity of truth, some remedial action
10 382 Pa. 553, 116 A. 2d 555 (1955).
11 357 Pa. 391, 54 A. 2d 865 (1947).
12 363 Pa. 585, 70 A. 2d 325 (1950).
13 301 Pa. 291, 152 Atd. 23 (1930).
14 307 Pa. 570, 161 At!. 721 (1932).
15 116 Pa. Super. 577, 177 At. 343 (1935).
16 175 Pa. Super. 52, 103 A. 2d 183 (1954).
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was imperative. The State Reporter had to be compelled by the processes of
the law he was defying to print the Dissenting Opinion which he had now
had in his possession for four months. Accordingly, the writer filed a Com-
plaint in Mandamus in the Commonwealth Court in Dauphin County.
In his Answer to the Complaint, Mr. Eldredge asserted that he was mere-
ly acting on the order of the Chief Justice in the matter. Then, under the head-
ing of New Matter, he went on to relate something which had transpired in
the Supreme Court consultation chamber. In the Complaint the writer had pain-
stakingly refrained from referring to judicial intramural discussions, but when
Mr. Eldredge pushed the door ajar so as to reveal only a slice of the chamber,
it became obligatory on the writer to fling the door wide open to let the light
of reality fall on all the proceedings, thus dissipating the half-truths result-
ing from only an angular view of the conference. Accordingly, in the Reply to
New Matter, the writer related:
"Paragraph 23. The plaintiff's Dissenting Opinion would have
been filed with the Majority Per Curiam Opinion had it not been for the
tacit understanding that the plaintiff reserved the right to file a dissent-
ing opinion in the event the test case was not begun.
"Paragraph 26 . . . the Chief Justice assured the plaintiff several
times that the Tribune case was coming before the Court again and it
was understood that if it did not, a Dissenting Opinion would be ac-
cepted." 1
7
These averments were not controverted by the defendant so that when he
moved for Judgment on the Pleadings in the Dauphin County Court, he ad-
mitted their verity.1s
Mr. Eldredge selected for counsel to represent him the former United
States Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts, the former United States Sen-
ator George Wharton Pepper, and the prominent Philadelphia lawyer Robert
T. McCracken. Counsel for the writer were former Common Pleas Judge J.
Dress Pannell, former Pennsylvania State Senator George Kunkel, and the prom-
inent Philadelphia lawyer James J. Davis. On December 22, 1954, the case was
argued in the Dauphin County courthouse before a full bench consisting of
Judges Paul G. Smith, Wm. H. Neely, Walter R. Sohn, Homer L. Kreider, and
Karl E. Richards.
It was the contention of Mr. Eldredge and his attorneys that the Supreme
Court could prohibit the publication of the Dissenting Opinion for any reason
it chose because it was clothed with supreme power in deciding the contents
of the State Reports. However, they pointed to no statute which conferred such
power; they cited no decision which awarded it omnipotence over the State Re-
17 See paper books and printed record in the case of Musmanno v. Eldredge, 382 Pa. 167, 114
A. 2d 511 (1955).
18 London v. Kingsley, 368 Pa. 109, 81 A. 2d 870 (1951); Sensinger v. Boyer, 153 Pa. 628,
26 Ad. 222 (1893); Fried v. Fisher, 328 Pa. 497, 19" AUt. 35 (1939).
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ports. Of course, their failure in this respect was due to the simple fact that
the law of Pennsylvania is empty of any such delegation of absolute authority.
Counsel did refer to the Act of June 12, 1878,19 which said that "The
Court shall cause to be reported such of its decisions," with a description, then,
of what those decisions were to be. But this Act of 1878 is only a relic in the
museum of the past. It was repealed by the Act of 1951.20 Defendant's counsel
also resurrected the Act of March 12, 1889,21 which said that the several Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court shall mark certain cases "to be reported" and that
cases not so marked were to be reported in an abbreviated form. But that Act
is also entombed with the dead, because it too was repealed by the Act of 1951,
supra. After citing these two defunct statutes, Justice Roberts proceeded with
a type of argument that one assuredly would never find in a text book on logic.
He asserted that since the Acts of 1878 and 1889 had given the Supreme Court
some discretion with regard to the printing of Opinions, the repeal of those
statutes now conferred upon the Supreme Court complete and untrammeled
authority in that matter. It was like saying that by withdrawing the authority
which allowed one to enter only two floors in a 50-story building, he was now
authorized to possess the whole fifty stories!
The Supreme Court has no inherent powers. It can only act under the
authority vested in it by the Pennsylvania Constitution which nowhere says that
the Court may decide which portion of its activities shall become known to the
public. It would be contrary to every principle of democracy that any depart-
ment of government should determine for itself how much of its business may
be evaluated by the people. If it were to be admitted that the Supreme Court
may suppress Dissenting Opinions, one would have to concede that it could al-
so shroud Majority Opinions; and eventually the legal profession, as well as
the general public, could never know with precision how much of the iceberg
of the law floated above and how much was hidden beneath the sea of revela-
tion.
In his brilliant argument before the Commonwealth in Harrisburg, Judge
Pannell quoted from Chief Justice Hughes who said:
"A dissent in a court of last resort is an appeal to the brooding spirit
of the law, to the intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may
possibly correct the error into which the dissenting judge believes the
court to have been betrayed." 22
Dissenting Opinions on constitutional questions are particularly "an appeal to
the brooding spirit of the law." It was perhaps for that reason that the Penn-
sylvania Legislature in 1868 provided that:
19 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 1691-1694, 1697, 1699, 1702-1706 (Purd0n 1930).
20 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 1690.1-.5 (Purdon 1955).
21 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 1696, 17d1 (Pudon 19 0).
22 32 J. Am. Jti. Sbc'y 106 (1048).
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"The reporter aforesaid is hereby authorized to publish minority
opinions of the said court on all constitutional questions." 23
The printing of Minority Opinions on constitutional questions is of paramount
importance because Constitutions are made and amended only by the people.
And how are they to know whether the Constitution is meeting the requirements
of the sovereign State unless there is absolute freedom of expression on the part
of the judges who interpret it?
It cannot be denied that a constitutional question was involved in the Tribune
case. In their prayer for relief the petitioners declared that the action of the
Westmoreland County Court in shutting out photographers from the court-
house and jail was:
"in contravention of the rights of Petitioner's members under Article
I of Section VII of the Constitution of Pennsylvania and under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States
and is an abridgement of the rights of Petitioner's members to freedom
of speech and of the press." (Emphasis added.)
The Tribune case, therefore, came precisely within the Statute of 1868.
Justice Roberts endeavored to argue that the Act of 1868 gave the State Report-
er discretion in determining whether or not to publish Minority Opinions on
constitutional questions; but it is unthinkable that the representatives of the
people would place in the hands of a State employee, in no way particularly
qualified for such selectivity, the power to decide what Minority Opinions on
the Constitution should be printed. The conclusive proof that the State Reporter
did not have any such power is demonstrated in the fact that since 1868 (and
for many years prior thereto) ALL Dissenting Opinions, on constitutional ques-
tions and non-constitutional questions, have been published in the State Reports.
We have seen that the Constitution does not give the Supreme Court the
privilege contended for it by Mr. Eldredge and his counsel, and it is clear also that
there is no statute conferring that absolute power on the defendant or the
Court. On what basis then could the Supreme Court order suppression of Jus-
tice Musmanno's Dissenting Opinion? Law is intended to be the essence of
reason. Even if it were to be assumed, arguendo, that some authority of print-
ing selectivity existed in the Supreme Court, certainly that power could not be
exercised arbitrarily. What would happen to our whole system of jurisprudence
if the highest appellate court of a State could, without reason, explanation, or
citation of statute or precedent, reverse a practice which has been accepted and
officially followed for over a hundred years?
In his argument before the Dauphin 'County Court, Justice Roberts never
attempted to justify the exclusion of the Dissent in the Tribune case on the
ground that it was filed "too late." His position was that the Court of Common
Pleas of Dauphin County could not order the State Reporter to disobey an order
28 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1695 (Purdon 1930).
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of the Supreme Court. And on that basis the Dauphin County Court on January
5, 1955, entered judgment in favor of the defendant.
The case was appealed to the Supreme Court, and it was argued in Phil-
adelphia on April 26, 1955. The writer, of course, being one of the litigants,
naturally did not sit on the argument. The Chief Justice and Justices Stearne,
Jones, Chidsey and Arnold were in effect litigants on the other side since they
had issued the order which suppressed the Dissenting Opinion. It could be
assumed, therefore, that they would not sit to pass judgment on their own act.
But they sat. There was precedent for the appeal to have been heard by Justice
Bell alone, because he had not voted for the non-publication of the Dissenting
Opinion. 24
Senator George Wharton Pepper and Attorney Robert T. McCracken pre-
sented the oral argument for the appellee. After Senator Kunkel made a pre-
liminary presentation the writer argued the case for the appellant.
In the Supreme Court, Eldredge through his counsel, advanced the strange
proposition that the Act of 1951 made him an agent of the Supreme Court. As
the writer stood at the lectern addressing the Court as counsel-litigant, and not
as an Associate Justice of that Court, he handed opposing counsel a copy of
the Act of 1951 and asked them to explain how, even by employing the most
tortured interpretation of words, they could arrive at the conclusion that the
Act in question made Eldredge a Supreme Court agent. Not only is the word
tagent" not used in the statute but there is not even the remotest hint that any
principal-agent relationship exists between the Supreme Court and the State
Reporter. An agent binds his principal. It is bizarre even to assume that any-
one without judicial qualifications or position could bind a judicial tribunal
on the principle of respondeat superior. Mr. Eldredge's role is an obvious one:
he is a State official charged with supervising the printing of State Reports. To
call the State Reporter an agent of the Court is as absurd as it would be to call
him an Assistant Justice.
Neither Senator Pepper nor Mr. McCracken was able to justify the use of
the word "agent," but in supporting the position of their client they assumed
they were defending the action of several members of the Supreme Court, which
in verity they were. Consequently they drew on any available weapon of argu-
mentation which appeared to them to uphold the Court's precipitate action in
ordering the non-publication of the writer's Dissenting Opinion. Unable to
point to any statute or decision which authorized the Supreme Court to exclude
Dissenting Opinions from the State Reports, they went to the extent of de-
daring that the State Reporter should not print any Dissenting Opinions at all!
Thus, they said:
"The function of the State Reporter is to make available to the
Bench and Bar decisional law of Pennsylvania as announced by its highest
24 Com. v. Mathues, 210 Pa. 372, 59 Ad. 961 (1904).
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court. The decisional law is the law which is stated in the opinion of the
Court. A dissenting opinion is no part of the decision but a protest against
it."
By advancing this argument, Mr. Eldredge placed himself in a position of stultify-
ing inconsistency since he is constantly printing Dissenting Opinions. In volume
375 of the State Reports, as late as October 15, 1953, in the case of May v.
Fidelity,2 5 he printed an 8,000-word Dissenting Opinion of the Chief Justice
which covered 26 pages. In his Dissenting Opinion Chief Justice Stern said:
"The result reached by the majority of the court in this case is so
contrary to what I conceive to be right and proper, and does such injus-
tice, as I firmly believe, to the grandchildren of the testatrix who have
been disinherited, that I cannot do other than record my earnest dis-
sent." (pp 147-173.)
Is that not a protest against the decision of the Court, and if so, why did Mr.
Eldredge print it? In November, 1954, he printed two Dissenting Opinions by
Justice Allen Stearne, neither of which had anything to do with constitutional
questions. Nor did the Chief Justice's voluminous dissent in the May case deal
with a constitutional question.
As the writer stood at the podium he piled up volume after volume of State
Reports until he feared the ceiling might be reached-all containing Dissenting
Opinions written by his colleagues, and not questioned by Mr. Eldredge or
anyone else. Nor were any of those dissents dedicated to constitutional questions.
If Mr. Eldredge printed these Dissenting Opinions, on what basis of reasoning
could he exclude the Dissent in the Tribune case?
In seeking to justify the Supreme Court's usurpation of authority in re-
fusing to publish the Tribune case Dissenting Opinion, Eldredge and his coun-
sel were apparently ready to go to any length in sophistry and equivocation. They
were even willing to sacrifice, in this particular instance, freedom of speech. They
said:
"The Court as a whole should have discretionary power to decide
in a given case that the publication of a particular dissenting opin-
ion would be contrary to public policy."
This would mean that the Supreme Court could exercise a totalitarian con-
trol which does not exist anywhere in the United States, namely, the power of
censorship. This would mean giving absolute authority to the majority of the
Supreme Court to decide what shall be said and how it shall be said by a Jus-
tice elected by the people and charged with the same responsibility as devolves
on those who happen to form for a brief, fleeting moment a majority.
In order to close the State Reports to the Dissenting Opinion, Eldredge and
his counsel were even willing to take to the execution block the inalienable right
of every American citizen to register a protest against what he regards to be
injustice. They said:
25 375 Pa. 135, 99 A. 2d 880 (1953).
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"The right of an individual Justice to record dissent is indisput-
able; but to have a dissenting opinion published is not an absolute right
but one which must be subordinated to considerations affecting the
dignity of the Court as an organ of government."
This said in effect that a Justice may dissent behind closed doors but he
may not dissent so that the people may know what is happening in their tribun-
als. Of what use would be a dissent that does not inform the legal profession
of the misapplication of law, of misinterpretation of facts, and ignoring of con-
stitutional guarantees that the dissenter sincerely believes he has found in the
Majority Opinion? To say that dissents may be suppressed in order to pre-
serve the dignity of the Court is to give a false meaning to the word dignity.
Dignity means, above all, integrity and forthrightness. Pointing out an error
or admitting an error is one of the most dignified acts that can be performed by
a human being or by an institution which places truth above all other considera-
tions. Justice Roberts probably held a similar view when he was on the Supreme
Court of the United States. In an incumbency of 15 years, he dissented 185 times.
The arguments advanced by defendant's counsel through their brief and
in person were an unrestrained attack on Dissenting Opinions, but no one could
know better than Justice Roberts and Senator Pepper that Dissenting Opinions
often become Majority Opinions. Many of the Dissenting Opinions by Jus-
tice Holmes and Justice Brandeis have today been embodied in the stare decisis
of the land.
On our own Supreme Court, Dissenting Opinions of one day have become
the ruling law of another day. In the case of Thomas v. Hempt Bros.,
26 Justice
Jones wrote the Majority Opinion and Justice Musmanno wrote a Dissenting
Opinion. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States
2 7
and the Supreme Court reversed. In the case of Meixell v. Hellerton Boro Coun-
cil,28 Justice Bell wrote the Majority Opinion and Justice Musmanno wrote a
Dissenting Opinion. A year later the same case came before the Supreme Court
again. This time the Majority reversed its previous position, and Justice Musman-
no wrote the Opinion for a unanimous Court. These two cases alone should
be enough to establish that the writing of Dissenting Opinions is not merely
a matter of exercising judicial penmanship. An enormous amount of hard work
goes into writing Dissenting Opinions,-work dedicated to truth, reason, and
the majesty of the law. Dissenting Opinions are so integrally a part of our legal
system that to defend them is as superfluous as carrying common law to Black-
stone. Yet, in the year of our Lord 1955, the Supreme Court of one of the oldest
States in the Union suppressed a Dissenting Opinion. And an ex-Justice of the
United States Supreme Court and an ex-Senator of the United States supported
that suppression. This would seem to point out quite dramatically that we can-
26 371 Pa. 383, 89 A. 2d 776 (1952).
27 345 U. S. 19 (1953).
28 370 Pa. 420, 88 A. 2d 594 (1952).
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not assume that our liberties are always so safe that they can never be lost or
damaged. We can never take for granted that representatives elected by the people,
whether in the Courts or in the Legislative Halls, will always be immune from
harassment as they speak out their honest conviction. Eldredge's attorneys went
so far in the case under discussion as to utter the most shocking doctrine that
has ever been presented in a courtroom. They said:
"Situations may well be imagined in which an angry Justice might,
if unrestrained by authority, impair or even destroy the public confi-
dence."
In the courtroom, now crowded with lawyers who had gathered to hear
the arguments, the writer replied to this amazing statement as follows:
."I want to say to the authors of this odious and contemptible dec-
laration of gag rule that when the time comes that an angry Justice,
if he be angry because of injustice being perpetrated in his presence,
may not speak out in behalf of justice, then the figure of Justice, al-
ways represented as blindfolded in the Courts, should whip off the band-
ages to see what is transpiring in the Courts under the name of justice!"
On May 25, 1955, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Dauphin
County Court and filed a "Per Curiam" Opinion. 29 The Opinion said that the
Dissenting Opinion in the Tribune case was filed "after the Court had ad-
journed its sessions for the summer and its members were scattered." But it
was not the fault of the writer that the members scattered. He remained at his
duties until they were accomplished. The business of the Court does not come
to a standstill because the Chief Justice and Associate Justices scatter like boys
at the end of school. Furthermore, the writer sent a copy of his Dissenting Opin-
ion to each one of the Justices at the addresses they themselves had furnished.
And each one of the Justices had this Dissenting Opinion in his possession for
four months before the question of publication arose so that they had ample op-
portunity to prepare and file comments on the Dissenting Opinion if they
were so minded.
The Court said further that the Dissenting Opinion was not a proper dis-
sent because "the Order of this Court in the Tribune case did not discuss, much
less decide, the merits of the very important legal question involved." But a
Dissenting Opinion is not limited to matters discussed in the Majority Opin-
ion. It often happens that a Dissenting Opinion is written for the precise reason
that the Majority of the Court failed to discuss or decide a very important ques-
tion in the case. The Court added that it "had expressed no views whatever"
on the merits of the controversy, but this statement did not accord with the
realities of the situation. The very order authorizing the argument, as we have
already indicated, declared that the Court would give consideration to "the
merits of the controversy," and it will be recalled that the Chief Justice and other
Justices discussed at length from the bench the merits of the controversy. The
29 382 Pa. 167, 114 A. 2d 511 (1955).
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fact then that the Majority failed to pass upon an issue which it had discussed
and considered did not preclude the writer from directing attention to it in his Opin-
ion. It is ridiculous to assume that because the Majority, as we see it, neglects
to discuss a very important constitutional question before it, a Justice of the
Minority should compound the neglect by a similar silence.
The Opinion filed by the 'Court on June 29, 1954, in the Tribune case, as
one glance at it will show, was very fragmentary and conveyed no idea to the
reader what propositions had been argued and how the Court arrived at its
conclusions. The Opinion gave no consideration whatever to the monumental
constitutional question raised in the briefs and at oral arguments, namely, free-
dom of the press. It became, therefore, almost imperative, if the legal pro-
fession was to derive any benefit or information from the Court's action, that
a comprehensive Opinion, stating all the facts and issues involved, be written.
The writer undertook that obligation. But his efforts in this direction turned
out to be fruitless when the State Reporter declined to publish his Opinion. Thus,
the report on the Tribune case, as it now appears in the State ReportsO remains
as a vague, meaningless statement on one of the most important problems
ever to come before the appellate court of any State in the Union.
In view of the fact that a lawsuit on the same question may still come be-
fore the Supreme Court, the Court said further that the writer's Opinion dis-
cussing the issue of the freedom of the press meant "prejudging a question
which was yet to come before this court." This statement is a non sequitur which
not even a vessel of irrelevancy would hold. Every case is decided on its current
merits and not on what may arise in future litigation. If the argument advanced
by the Court in this respect were to be literally followed, it would mean that
the 'Chief Justice would be disqualified from considering the subject of the
Westmoreland County Rule of Court if and when it comes before us again be-
cause, according to the President Judge of the Westmoreland Court of Com-
mon Pleas, the Chief Justice approved of the embattled Rule of Court before
it was promulgated.3 '
On August 18, 1955, in a speech delivered before a convention of the
State chief justices of the nation in Philadelphia, Chief Justice Stern said that
Dissenting Opinions should be written only on "really important problems."8 2
But who determines whether a problem is important or not? Is there a litigant
who has felt that the problem which has been gnawing at his spirit, corroding
his soul, and robbing his nights of sleep is not an important one? Was the
problem in the Tribune case not an important one? It dealt with nothing less
than freedom of the press. Is that not important?
80 379 Pa. 92 (1955).
31 PHILADELPHIA LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 17, 1954; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Feb. 16, 1954;
Pittsburgh Press, Feb. 17, 1954.
32 Philadelphia Inquirer, Aug. 19, 1955; Pittsburgh Press, Aug. 19, 1955; Pittsburgh Post-
Gazette, Aug. 20, 1955.
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The Chief Justice said also in that speech that he did not read Justice
Musmanno's Dissenting Opinions. This was indeed an extraordinary admission
because the most important function of a Chief Justice is to ascertain the vote
and views of the Justices of the Court over which he presides. Failing to read
and to give consideration to Dissenting Opinions may not only lead the Court
into embarrassing situations; it may well throw particular branches of decisional
law into alarming chaos. One illustration will suffice.
On March 14, 1955, the Majority of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
handed down a decision in the case of Perpetua v. Phila. Transportation Co., 38
from which decision the writer dissented. The plaintiff-motorist in that case
was denied recovery in spite of the fact that he was proceeding through an
intersection on a green light when he was struck by a motor bus entering the
intersection against a red light, the majority of the Court holding that the
plaintiff's case failed to show that he continued to look as .he proceeded through
the intersection.
On June 27, 1955, three months later, in the case of Koehler v. Schwartz,
8 4
the Supreme Court allowed a recovery in precisely the same fact-situation which
obtained in the Perpetua case, namely, the plaintiff-motorist, with a green traf-
fic light in his favor, was proceeding through an intersection when he was
struck by a trailer-truck which entered the intersection with a red light against
it.
That an appellate court should, within three months, decide the same
fact-situation in two wholly opposite ways is deplorable, of course, but there
is something much more revealing involved here than inconsistency. Justice
Musmanno wrote the Dissenting Opinion in the Perpetua case; he wrote the
Opinion for a unanimous Court in the Koehler case. The law which he set forth
in the Koehler case is precisely the same law which he expressed in his Dis-
senting Opinion in the Perpetua case-almost verbatim. Had the Chief Justice
read the Dissenting Opinion in the Perpetua case, the Court may not have been
placed in the incongruous position of handing down law in two different ways
over a period of only three months. How are lawyers to advise their clients
when the Supreme Court fluctuates in its appraisement of cardinal principles
of law in this fashion?
The subject of Dissenting Opinions has become an interesting topic for
discussion at judicial conferences and bar association meetings, but no one can
seriously believe that without Dissenting Opinions the law would progress as
it should and must. Dissenting Opinions are often the pillars which are ready
to take over the burden of supporting a sagging principle of law when the
reasons of the Majority in a given case may weaken and fall. Dissenting Opin-
83 380 Pa. 561, 112 A. 2d 337 (1955).
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ions have often been the shock troops in the battle for justice on the battle-
field of reason versus formality and intelligence versus blind technicality.
The filing and printing of Dissenting Opinions is part of the classic Amer-
ican system of checks and balances. If Majority Opinions are to be regarded
as infallible and as the expression of a unanimous Court when in fact they
may not be, a system will have been developed which will perpetuate error,
stifle correction, and paralyze progress in the law which must ever command
the needs of today.
If the day should ever come that the majority may suppress minority
views, it would be a devastating blow to democracy, because the history of the
human race establishes conclusively that no power or institution, no matter how
honorably disposed, can have absolute power without some day exercising that
power to the grave detriment of the people.
The quest for truth must be unceasing. There must always be a chal-
lenge to smugness, there must ever be a protest against an over-assurance
born of uninhibited power. Secular infallibility is either a product of the imag-
ination, or of the ego exerted through absolute force, or through the supine in-
difference of those it would enslave. In any event, it cannot co-exist with
the living, breathing spirit of the Law.

